Rating - 2.5: parts of it are worth reading once (borrow it from a library)
Rating - 2: not worth reading (skip it)It is difficult enough to motivate yourself to read academic prose without the argument's failing halfway through. I agree with Prof. Barnett's approach to constitutional interpretation and am sympathetic to the case he wants to make, but I do not believe that this book's argument carries the day. [Update: but the early parts are worth reading.]
Randy Barnett sets forth a theory of constitutional legitimacy based on natural rights and of constitutional interpretation and construction based on original meaning. He is a scholar of the Ninth Amendment, so this treats heavily upon retained rights, which have been trampled by the expansion of the government far beyond its enumerated powers.
I will start by saying that I am always pleased by a return to the Founders in discussion of modern politics. We do not see enough references to
The Federalist Papers in our daily lives. American traditions are not so old that we cannot return to our founding documents in considering the current system.
That is centerpiece of Prof. Barnett's approach to the Constitution, original meaning originalism. Frankly, there are not a lot of other options beyond originalism and making things up. Most constitutional interpretations and constructions are mixes of those two: you argue either that the Constitution says what you want it to say or that it does not but we should pretend it does anyway. Usually, you phrase "pretend" in some way to make it sound like what you are making up is really in there, really, if you keep looking or extend the argument that the text is really making, really, keep looking. This is how we get "penumbras, formed by emanations": if you put several lights on the Constitution, from the right angles, and look in the half-shadows, you can make out the shape of the policy you want to be there.
"Original meaning originalism" is looking at the words of the Constitution (or whatever else you are interpreting) and seeing how they would be understood by a contemporary. The meaning of a law or contract is set when it is enacted; the meaning does not shift, and it is not a living document. This is distinguished from original
intent in that we are not going to divine what the lawmakers really intended (rather than what they actually wrote). Many people plead original intent because they really want to believe that the Founders would have agreed with them on most issues, at least the smart ones.
In reality, the reasons that a law is passed are often something other than the high-minded rhetoric that is entered into the public record, and a great many legislators have voted for something that did not mean what they thought it meant (or they might not have read it at all). The opponents and cynics are usually more on-target for what a law means and does.
It is on this rock that the argument founders. Prof. Barnett argues that the Necessary and Proper Clause limits Congress to enumerated powers, with a narrow reading of "Necessary" that is tightly bound by "Proper." He relies heavily on James Madison for this argument, and who could be a better source for what the Constitution means than the Father of the Constitution?
Sadly, President-to-be Madison lost. Those who have argued for a strict limitation to enumerated powers seem to have lost right from the beginning. Either the Constitution does not mean what Madison thought it meant, or people started distorting it before it was even ratified.
In the Constitution and Bill of Rights, we find that opponents' most dire predictions were fair if not understatements. The Anti-Federalists said that this Constitution created a national government that would undermine federalism and assume virtually all powers to itself; it has. People argued against the Bill of Rights on the grounds that enumerated rights would be treated as an exhaustive list rather than examples; they were right.
Consider there to have been two dichotomies: the Constitution does or does not establish a government of nigh-unlimited powers, and a government of nigh-unlimited powers is or is not a good thing. This gives you four positions: the Constitution limits, which is good; does not, which is bad; does, which is bad, or does not, which is good. When you vote, you do not mark "yes because..." so it is hard to tell whether those who voted for the Constitution favored enumerated or broad powers.
We find Madison and Hamilton arguing on the same side for the Constitution in
The Federalist Papers, both arguing for provisions that they opposed in the interest of passing the whole. The Constitution was sufficiently ambiguous to accommodate proponents of enumerated or expansive powers, both of whom made public statements in favor the document contrary to their documented positions elsewhere. I am struck again by the difference between public statements and actual meaning.
Given that respectable people of the time disagreed about the meaning of the Constitution's plain language, there is considerable room for discretion in constitutional construction. Where the text is ambiguous, you must build something on top of it, and the evidence presented here is not strong enough to tightly constrain that construction.
Perhaps this is a flaw in original meaning originalism, if there can be such dispute about the plain meaning of the words even at the time. That there is dispute does not change the facts of the matter, but it does give us pause 200 years later as we try to pick out the facts. Eyewitness accounts differ, as it were.
What I take away from the extended First Bank of the United States example is that Madison lost. The Bank was the first big test of how expansive the new national government's powers were. The majority of Congress voted for the Bank, the President signed it into law, and the Supreme Court upheld it. It is hard to take that as evidence that Madison's understanding of the plain meaning was the common one. At best, it allows you to argue that the Necessary and Proper Clause needs construction, which you think should go your way; it certainly provides no aid for an interpretation of strictly enumerated powers.
If one perspective seems to have lost almost every significant fight since the Founding (outside the
Lochner Court), it seems questionable that it is the true original meaning. If we are warned at every turn about what horrible things will happen, and we do it anyway, it becomes hard to argue that the consequences are accidental.
I do think that Prof. Barnett gets the better of the battle he pitches between the Ninth Amendment and Footnote Four (-Plus). Unfortunately, as he says, there has been little attempt to take the Ninth Amendment seriously, and jurisprudence concerning it is about as extensive as Third Amendment jurisprudence. Also, he is relying on Madison's losing Bank argument again. Finally, because there is a matter of construction in the establishment of unenumerated retained rights, the plain text of the Ninth Amendment does not make for a slam dunk over the presumption of constitutionality.
The chapter on the Commerce Clause starts out tightly argued but falters as it goes on. "Commerce means trade" is a textbook example of textualist originalism, delving into uses of the word. "Among the Several States" receives similar treatment;
Gonzales v. Raich and
Wickard v. Filburn were travesties. "Regulate does not prohibit" is weaker, because it admits including prohibition in part, and Congress need only define the subject sufficiently large to define the prohibition as only a part. To use an example cited, if Congress cannot regulate lotteries by prohibiting them, it could regulate
gambling by prohibiting lotteries and allowing other types. "If you want to gamble, you must do so in this way."
A difficulty of the writing style is excessive writing
for and limited writing
against. You would think that an attempt to overthrow most of a century's constitutional interpretation would have more animosity, a greater feeling of clashing titans. Instead, I am left with the feeling that the other side has been sold short, if represented at all.
The first quarter of the book, for example, addresses how we establish the legitimacy of government and in what conditions laws bind in conscience. I presume this is a live issue in Prof. Barnett's intended audience, although most citizens are content to follow laws because men with guns enforce them. Maybe it is taken as a given that we all know about popular sovereignty as the dominant theory.
Some of this is just a matter of unusual ordering. Prof. Barnett tends to make his case before arguing against his opponents. I expect someone to demolish the old building before constructing a new one in its place. It is a matter of when you introduce the villain in your storytelling. Maybe we are assumed to know who the enemy is; I am too sympathetic to the book to be able to assume that of a general audience.
There are some oddities in which sources are selected and neglected or which uses are favored. At times, Prof. Barnett makes a great deal about how two words are used together consistently ("Necessary and Proper"), so they must have distinguishable meanings and separate import. In another case, "commerce and trade" is treated like "completely and totally" or "flotsam and jetsam" (ignore this latter example if you know the difference between them; there is none in normal use). This is another point where the brief treatment of the opposing position leads me to wonder what has gone entirely unmentioned, although it could be hideously unfair to ask for point-by-point explanations of why all 803 uses of "regulate" and "regulation" in the
Pennsylvania Gazette support (or fail to oppose) his position (and I would not read it if someone wrote it).
Prof. Barnett receives props for being the first author I have ever seen argue explicitly for a self-evident, unalienable natural right to drink (one's own) Diet Mountain Dew (page 59 of the hardcover). Strictly, he only asserts such a right
when one is thirsty, but I think his view of natural rights is broad enough to allow soda consumption at your discretion. (I should note this is not being entirely flip; one of the Founders cited refers to one's natural right to wear a hat as an example of, "Look, we could spell all this out, but do we really need to?")
The Structure of Liberty looks interesting, so I may need to read another of Prof. Barnett's books. For many topics where I was interested in further depth, he pointed there.
As a last random note, it is hard to argue that there neither is nor ever has been a "Constitution in Exile" movement with this book's existence. "No, it's not exiled, just kind of lost...since
Lochner."
Wikipedia cites this book as the key example of such a movement (of which no one claims to be a member). If you are interested in discussion of that, Wikipedia also helpfully provides a
link to a
Volokh Conspiracy set of discussions on the topic. Prof. Barnett is a contributor to that group blog.
Amazon link
Laissez Faire Books linkAuthor's website